Freeway Park Building, Inc. v. Western States Wholesale Supply, Bill .J. Polteno and Jack E. Lords : Respondent\u27s Brief by unknown
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1968
Freeway Park Building, Inc. v. Western States
Wholesale Supply, Bill .J. Polteno and Jack E. Lords
: Respondent's Brief
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.F. Burton Howard v. Attorneys for Respondent
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Freeway Park v. Western States Wholesale, No. 11279 (1968).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/3413
IN TH1~ SUPREME C01URT . 
I - ' ' , 
~f the , 
·STATE· OF_ UfiAH, 
. I ' , ' I 
FREEWAY ~ARR B:cJIL1)!N'G, INC'., -
'I ' 
.,I 
,. 
'\ 
/ .· . \ '" ' 1 _:1 
h., 1,, 
'l'AHLJ~ OF CON':C.BJNT~ 
Page 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE _ __ _ _______________ -------------··--- 1 
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE BY LOWER COURT ·-·--------· 1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL ____________ _ ____ -·---·······--····--···-· 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS·---· ________ ---------·------····-·-···--········· 2
ARGUMENT ------------------··-------------------·-·-------·--------··-·--·--··-·····--------· 6 
POINT I. THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING A 
WRONGFUL ATTACHMENT AND THAT DE-
FENDANTS WERE THEREBY WRONGFULLY 
EVICTED FROM THE PREMISES IN QUESTION ______ 6 
POINT II. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING 
TO SUBMIT THE QUESTIONS OF GENERAL AND 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES TO THE JURY ··-·--·······--·-···--·-12 
POINT III. DEFENDANTS ARE ESTOPPED TO 
ASSERT WRONGFUL ATTACHMENT ·---··-···········--··-··-15 
POINT IV. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN 
AWARDING NOMINAL DAMAGES AGAINST 
PLAINTIFF AND IN FAILING TO AW ARD 
PLAINTIFF ATTORNEYS FEES ····-·--··-······-········-········· 16 
CONCLUSION -·-··---···············---·-·-···-··---····-······-·····-······················· 16 
AUTHORITIES CITED 
CASES 
Bryant v. Osgood, 52 N.H. 182 -------·------·--·--······-······················· 8, 11 
Cahoon v. Hoggan, 31 Ut. 74, 86 Pac. 963 ····-·········-·······-·····-···-··· 14 
Fidelity and Deposit Co. of Maryland v. Cobb, 213 Ky. 
467, 281 SW 478 ·-··-----------·······-··-----------·----------····················· 15 
First National Bank v. McKean, (CCA Ore.) 285 Fed. 557 ---· 15 
Florea v. Schultz, 128 Misc. 77, 217 NYS 764 ·····--·--··-····-·-·--····· 11 
Hibbard v. Zenor, 75 Iowa 471, 39 NW 714 ······--------···------··--- 9 
Jenkins v. Morgan, 123 Utah 480, 260 P.2d 532 ----------------------- 13 
i\J id-Continent Engineering Co. v. Arrow Petroleum Corp., 
45 Fed. Supp. 1000 ----------------··-·-----·-··-----···-···-···-···---------··-----· 15 
Page 
New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Utility Battery Mfg. Co., 
122 Fla. 718, 166 So. 856 _____ __ -------------------·---------------------- _ 13 
Page Seed Co. v. City Hardware Store, 96 N.H. 359, 
77 A.2d 35, 22 ALR 2d 1288 ---------------------------------------- 8, 10, 11 
Rachelman v. Skinner, 46 Minn. 196, 48 NW 776 ---------------------- _ 14 
Safford v. Morris Metal Products Co., 99 Conn. 372, 
121 A. 885 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 11 
Taylor v. Shoemaker, 34 Ala. App. 168, 38 So.2d 895 ______________ 12 
STATUTES 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 
Section 38-3-1 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 7 
Section 38-3-3 ------------------------·--------------------------------------------- _ 7, 14 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 64 C (e) (3) _____________________ --·------------------·-------·------------- __ 8 
OTHER AUTHORITIES 
6 Am Jur 2d, Attachment, Sec. 296 ----------------------------------------- __ 9 
6 Am Jur 2d, Attachment, Sec. 298 -------------------------------------------- 10 
6 Am Jur 2d, Attachment, Sec. 597 ------------------------------------------ 14 
6 Am Jur 2d, Attachment, Sec. 617 -------------------------------------------- 14 
22 Am Jur 2d, Damages, Sec. 173 ________________ --·------------------------- _ 12 
7 CJS, Attachment, Sec. 223 ----------------·-------- ------------------------------ 9 
7 CJS, Attachment, Sec. 313 -----------------------------------···------------------ 15 
Anno. 22 ALR 2d 1273 ____________________ ------------------------------------------ 8, 10 
Anno. 22 ALR 2d 1288 ---------------------------------·-·-·-··--·------------------------10 
IN THE SUPREME CO'URT 
of the 
ST A TE OF UTAH 
I•'HEJ~WAY PARK BUILDING, INC., 
Plaint·iff and ResJHJ11deut, 
vs. 
WESTERN S'l1A'l1 ES 'WHOLESALE 
SUPPLY, BILL .J. POL'l1ENO and 
.TACK E. LORDS, 
Defenda11ts <111d Ap1Jellants. 
HESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMEN'r OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
11279 
'rhis is an action by Plaintiff to collect rental on a 
lease and for attachment of property to secure such 
rentals. Defendants and Appellants counterclaim for 
wrongful attachment and wrongful eviction claiming gen-
eral and punitive damages. 
DrnPOSITION OF THE CASI<~ BY LOWER COUR'J1 
The Trial Court granted Judgment to Plaintiff for 
ttn1mid rentals bnt determined that Plaintiff's attach-
lllrnt was wrongful and awarded nominal damagPs to 
Dt.•fendants. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment 
and Motion to Strike 'l'<'stimony of Anticipated Damaw~ 
inadP afte1· the trial of tl11• issnes, w<'re grantPd and tlw 
C'omt found that Plaintiff':-; attacl111wnt wa:-; not rnali-
e1u11" or witl1out prohahl1~ cau:-;e. 
2 
RELIEF' SOUGH'l1 ON APPEAL 
Defendants and Respondents seek ren~rsal of tlw 
.J udgnrnnt of the lower Court and ;judgment in their 
favor as a matter of law or a retrial of the issues befor<' 
a Jury. 
Plaintiff seeks to sustain the judgment, or that fail-
ing, by way of cross assignment of error, requests judg-
ment based on the record and as a matter of law with 
regard to the following points: 
1. Plaintiff did not wrongfully attach premise~ 
leased to Defendants nor evict them from such premises, 
constructively or otherwise. 
2. Even assuming wrongful attachment, Defendant~ 
are estopped from asserting such wrongful attachrnt>nt. 
3. As Plaintiff is without fault herein, the lower 
Court erred in awarding nominal damages against it and 
in failing to award it attorney fees. 
On February 18, 1965, Plaintiff, hereinaftPr called 
].,reeway, leased certain premises to Defendants. Pursu-
ant to this lease, Defendants prepaid th<' first and last 
month's rental. (R. 3) 
The premises were used to store inventory eonsi:-;t-
ing of aluminum siding, steel siding, stone and almuinnn1 
roofing and composition roofing and as the headqnarkr~ 
for Defendants' wholesale and retail aluminum ::;i<ling 
3 
business. (R. 142-146) The testimony of Defendant Jack 
K Lords varied as to whether forty percent or eighty 
percent of available warehouse space was so utilized. 
(R. 143, 146) 
rrhe payment for the period July 15 to August 15, 
19GG ,,-as not made by Defendants and no payuwnt was 
made thereafter. (R. 73) 
On 8epternber 23, 1966, Freeway filed a Complaint-
seeking jnde,1111ent against Defendants for $1,044.00 ren-
tal due to and including Septeil1ber 15th, for adc!itional 
rrnt, for attorney's fees, for a writ of attachment and 
a writ of restitution. (R. 1-5) 
An Affidavit was filed on September 23rd, a writ of 
attachment was obtained from the Court, and a Praecipe 
issued to the Sheriff of Salt Lake County instructing him 
to attach all the personal property located on the prem-
istis occupied by Defendants, to change the locks on said 
premises, to remove all persons located therein, and to 
tah physical possession thereof. (R. 5, 15, 16) 
Pursuant to the Praecipe, the Sheriff attached the 
personal property belonging to Defendants which was 
in the leased premises on September 26, 1966. (R. lG, 73) 
On September 30th, Freeway amended its Complaint 
requesting additional rental, specifying attorney's fees, 
and again requested a writ of attachment or alternatiyely, 
a writ of restitution. (R. 8-10) 
D<•f t>ndants furnished an undertaking as l'l'<-ftli n.J 
IJ\ Hnl<· G-1: C(f) and a hearing was held by the Court 
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on October 6, 1966, as which time Freeway'8 attacluut•nt 
was dissolved and the bond of Defendants 8llb8titnte<l 
therefor. (R. 7) Freeway's attachment \\'U8 discharged 
by Order of the Court on October 7, 1966. (R. 17) 
On October 6, 1966, a three day notice to }Jay rent 
or terminate tenancy wa8 served pernonally upon De-
fendants and thereafter, on October 11th, Fret:•way wa~ 
allowed to again amend and base an additional claim on 
unlawful detainer. ( R. 23, 27-32) Defendants thereafter 
moved to dismiss on the grounds that the three day 
notice was not served prior to the filing of the action, 
which motion was denied by the Court on October 14, 
1966. (R. 26, 37) 
At the time of the dissolution of the attachment on 
October 6, 1966, Freeway tendered the keys to premises 
to Defendants who refused to accept them. (R. 113-114) 
After the attachment, no effort was made by Dt'-
fendants to establish another office. (R. 182) No effort 
was made to maintain telephone service even though thl' 
majority of Defendants' businc~ss was condncted by 
phone. (R. 182-184) 
Defendants had decided to abandon the bnildiug 
prior to October 6, 1966. (R. 1G7) However, Defendant 
Jack E. Lords continued to operate '\Vestern States 
Wholesale Supply after October 6, Wfifi until the present 
time. (R. 130, 138) 
Pursuant to a Motion for Production of Document:-;, 
Defendants produced State and Federal Income reax lfr-
turns for Western States Wholesale Supply Company, 
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which returns indicate that the Defrndant Company had 
a net loss in the year 1965 of $281.11 and a net loss in 
the year 19GG of $3,238.49. (R. 156) (Ex. P. 8, P. 9, P. 10, 
P. 11, P. 12) 
l)pfendants contend that as a n~sult of the Plaintiff's 
attachment they lost the services of eighteen salesmen, 
the profit from $15,780.00 in inventory and the loss of a 
husiness doing a five months gross of $136,016.03 in 
J %(), \\'ith an approximate net income for five months in 
l9G6 of $14,973.72. (R. 56-59, 136) 
In this regard the record reveals: 
W <:'Stern States Wholesale Supply Com1mny also did 
business under the name of West States Construction. 
(R. 147) It maintained a different bank account for each 
operation, but co-mingled funds from its ·wholesale and 
retail operations. (R. 148) 
Wes tern States had no money in the bank between 
Augnst 1, 1966 and September 26, 1966. (R. 152, 236) 
\Vestern States reported to the Federal Government 
on J nne 14, 1967 that it did not have sufficient informa-
tion to compute its 1966 income. (R. 158) However, the 
income projection with which it seeks to establish lost 
income for purposes of its counterclaim herein was pre-
pared at the request of Plaintiff's counsel in 1966. (R. 
15:l) (Dep. of Jack E. Lords, page 8-9); (R. 2Hi) This 
pro,jedion was not based on ledger cards kept to detail 
income. (R. 217) 
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' Defendants' Accountant a<lmittPd that the income 
statement relied on might not he 01w hm1dr<'d percent 
correct. ( R. 202) 
As of June 14, l9G7 the booh of ~Western Statt>s 
Whole Supply Company were not postPd up to and in-
cluding August, 1966. (R. 215) 
The same income items were reportt>d differently to 
the Internal Revenue Service than to the trial court 
below. (R. 157, 160, 163, 164, 17G, 177, 213, 220, 231) 
The 1966 tax return of Western States \\Thole Sn1J-
ply Company and the testimony of .Jack K Lords show 
that the company had lost money prior to the attachment 
herein. (R. 251) 
-~-
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING A WRONGFUL 
ATTACHMENT AND THAT DEFENDANTS WERE 
THEREBY WRONGFULLY EVICTED FROM THE 
PREMISES IN QUESTION. 
Defendants appear to accnse Freeway of forciblt· 
entry solely because of the fact that a notice to quit was 
served by Plaintiff after the cormneneement of this ae-
tion. However, no entry was made, nor does Freeway 
rely on the unlawful detainer statute herein. The only 
entry made by the Plaintiff herein was pursuant to 
Court Order authorizing a writ of attachment and 
through the person of the Sheriff. r11he re<1niremPnt~ 
of forcible entry (i.e. absPnee of the legal o\\·ner, fon' 1'-
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t:>tPalth, frand, etc.) as 8et forth in the ca8e8 of Appel-
lant8' Brief are not present in this case. 
Nevertheless, and notwithstanding the allegation of 
Point I of Defendants' Brief to the contrary, the lower 
Comt found Defendants and Appellants "entitled to a 
jndgrnent that such attachment was wrongful and that 
they wPre thereby wron,qf'ully evicted from the premises 
described in Plaintiff's Complaint." (Emphasis added) 
(R. 94). 
Plaintiff assigns error to this finding of wrongful 
attachment and resulting wrongful eviction. 
On September 26, 1966, Plaintiff had a lien on the 
personal property located on the premises occupied by 
Defendants. This lien arose pursuant to Section 38-3-1, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which provides: 
"Except as hereinafter provided, lessors shall 
have a lien for rent due upon all non-exempt 
property of the lessee brought or kept upon the 
leased premises so long as the lessee shall occupy 
said premises and for thirty days thereafter." 
The Plaintiff was entitled to an attachment of the 
personal property on the said premises in aid of its lien. 
~rction 38-3-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides in 
pertinent part: 
"Whenever any rent shall be due and unpaid 
nn<l<:>r a lease ... the lessor may have the personal 
property of the le8see which is upon the leased 
premises, and suhect to such lien, attached with-
out other ground for such attachment." 
8 
In order to attach personal pro1wrty, tlu-' attaching 
party is required to take such property into his custody. 
Jn this regard, Rule 64 C ( e) (3), Utah Rules of Ci,·iJ 
Procedures, provides in part: 
"rl1he office1· to whom the writ is directed must 
execute the same without delay ... as follows: 
(3) Personal property capable of manual 
deliven• must be attached b,\· taking it into 
custody ... " 
A levy upon personality must be made by seiznn· 
and a change of possession of the chattels from a debtor 
to the attaching officer. This change of possession or a 
taking into custody may be either actual or constructin>, 
according to the nature of the property, and gem•rally 
speaking, the custody and control should be such a~ 
to Pnable the officer to retain or assert his power so 
that it cannot properly be withdrawn or taken Ii.' 
another without his knowing it. It is essPntial to a 
valid attachment that chattels be taken out of the control 
of an attachment debtor. See Bryant v. Osgood, 52 N".H. 
182; Page Seed Co. c. City Hardware Store, 96 N.H. 
~1~9. 77 A 2d 35, 22 ALR 2d 1273. 
The attaching officer must do more than place a 
guard on the premises. 'Yhile this may constitute a dai1n 
of dominion oYer the property, it does not neces~arily 
earry with it the power to exercise that dominion M 
it dotis not exclude owners from the building or ]ll'ewnt 
tlH'lll from assuming the control and cart' oYer the prnp-
t'l't,\· and they art> not tlwrt>b,\· deprin•d of po:':'t'~!'iPIL 
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~(·P Jlif;!Jard 1;. Zenor, 75 lowa 471, 39 N.vY. 714. See 
also, 7 CJ S, Attachment, Sec. 223. 
The general rule in this area is summarized in 6 Am . 
• J ur. 2d, Attadnnent and Garnisl1111ent, Sec. 296, where 
it i::; stated: 
"As a general rule, a levy of an attachment 
npon personal property is made by a seizure or 
taking of possession or custody of the property, 
either actual or constructive, and as far as prac-
ticable under the circumstances. Or, as it has been 
expressed in many cases, the levying officer must 
do some act for which he could be successfully 
prosecuted as a trespasser if it were not for the 
protection afforded him by the writ. A mere 
paper levy is not in general sufficient unless a 
statute makes it so. 
"However, the above requirements do not 
mean necessarily that the officer must actually 
Jay his hands on the property or take it manually 
into his possession, at least if he has taken cus-
tod)· or control thereof in some manner as by 
tlu~ appointment of a keeper or by having the 
property in his view and announcing the attach-
ment. Nor need he remove the property in every 
ease. In fact, the nature of the property may be 
such as to make manual seizure impractical or 
impossible, as in the case of cumbersome or bulky 
articles, or a credit or chose in action in favor of 
the defendant but not represented by a written 
instrument." 
While it is necessary that the attaching officer take 
pos:sPssion or custody of property in order to have a 
1 alid attachment it is not necessary that cumbersome or ' . . 
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bulky property be removed from the premi~ws. See Page 
Seed Co. v. City Hardu·ar<' Store, ~)() N.H. ~~59, 77 A 2d 
35; Annotation 22 ALR 2d 1273. 
rrhe general rule is t->ummarized in G Am. J ur. 2d, 
.A .. ttachment and Oarnit->hment, Sec. 298, wherein it j,, 
stated: 
"It is generally held that where the proJJerty 
to be attached is of such a bulkv or cmnberso1m 
nature that its seizure and r~moval would be 
attended with great expense or difficulty, tJ1e 
property need not be manually seized or removed; 
it is sufficient if the acts of the officer are such 
as to put the property out of the control of the 
attachment debtor. Accordingly, it is not neces-
sary to remove frmn the place in which they at1' 
fo1J;nd lrnlky articles difficult of removal, such m· 
pile.s of lumber, bricks, or stones, although tl11 
fact that such property is diffic1tlt of removal 
does not exc'Use the failure of an officer to take 
possession; it is nPvertheless incumbent on him 
to do whatever may be necessary to take the prop-
erty into legal cnstodr." (J£n11Jhasis Supplied) 
Many cases have held that placing a new lock on 
and locking the door of a store or business to attach the 
personal property located therein, effectively places sai<l 
property in the control and custody of an attaching offi-
cer and constitutes a valid attachment. 
In the case of Pa_qe Seed Co. v. City Hardw1irc 
Store, 96 N.H. 359, 77 A 2d 35, 22 ALR 2d 1288, the 
sheriff attached all the chattels and pernonal property of 
the Defendant located on the premises of the suhjt>d 
hardware store by going to the premises on Christrna~ 
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Uay whil<• the store was dosed, placing a new clasp on 
(•ach of tlH" three doors and locking each wjth a padlock. 
The Court held that the sheriff had taken exclusive and 
actual ctrntod.v and control of the ::mbject property, that 
the attaehment was valid and that it was unnecessary for 
the sheriff to physically remove the personalty from 
the premises in order to place the same within his cus-
tody and control. 
Similarly in the case of Florea 1.·. Sclrnltz, 128 Misc. 
11, 217 NYS 704, the attaching officer le,·ied upon 
goods jn a store by serving the debtor-lessee with a 
1rrit of attachment, taking the keys and putting a new 
lock on the door. The Court upheld the validity of the 
attachment, stating: 
''It is not necessary for an executing officer 
to actually remove all property attached. He takes 
possession of it. That is sufficient. Physical pos-
session means taking hold of the property, exer-
cising control over it." 
lncll•ed, if the attaching officer does not in all catM' 
]int C'hatkls in a building out of the control of the debtor, 
the validity of his attachment is open to question. See 
!Jry((Jzt c. Osgood, 52 N.H. 182; Page Seed Co. u. City 
llordu·arc, Sitpra. So in the case of Safford i:. Morris 
Metal Products Co., 99 Conn. 372, 121 A. 885, an attach-
n1ent was declared invalid because the attaching officer 
''did not tell the superintendent or an>· other per-
son what property he claimed under the attach-
nwnt and did not IJO~t anv notiee coneerning the ' . 
:-wil'.nn• of an.v pro1wrt~·, did not change an>· locks 
or kt·ys, nor take, demand, or l'<'L!Uest any keys, or 
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even inquire tonterning tlH· t>xistence of anv kPY, 
or locks, and did not segregate or maintain ·att~al 
physical possession of any property ... ". 
Plaintiff submits that as the personal property 
attached in the instant proceeding consisted of roofing, 
siding and office equipment which wm; cumbersome and 
bulky, the physical removal of \vhich would have bePu 
inconvenient and expensive, that changing the lock8 un 
the premises and locking the door of Plaintiff's ware-
house was a proper way to affect an attachment on th!' 
said personalty. 
POINT II 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO SUB-
MIT THE QUESTIONS OF GENERAL AND PUNI-
TIVE DAMAGES TO THE JURY. 
The Trial Court granted Plaintiff's Motion to StrikP 
rrestimony of Anticipated Damages at the close of the 
trial of the issues below. This Motion was bast,'{} uµun 
the speculative and uncertain nature of these damage~ 
and the fact that Appellants' business was new and had 
not shown profit. 
As a general rule, evidence of expected profits frorn 
a new business is too speculative, uncertain and remotf' 
to be considered, and does not meet the legal standard 
of reasonable certaint~·. 22 Arn. Jnr. 2d, Damages, R\'c 
173. 
Recovery for lost profits is not generally allo\\"t'il 
for injury to a new business ·with no hi::story of profifr 
68 38 Q ·1ii See Taylor v. Shoemaker, 34 Ala. App. l , -~o. -
895. 
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The case of New Amsterdam Casualty Company v. 
Ctility Battery Manufactitring Company, 122 Fla. 718, 
J(j(j So. S5G, is pertinent. In that case, an action for 
anticipated profits of a commercial business was founded 
11pon [ffOJJer testimony of a decrease in gross business 
and of estimated future profits. The claimant operated 
its business for a period of more than three months prior 
to tl1P acts claimed to have interferred with its right to 
do business, but it did not appear from the record or the 
('Yidence that it had ever made a profit on such business. 
The Florida Court held that where there ·was no 
im>of that the hn:::;iness had been profitable prior to the 
ad complained of, it was error to admit evidence of a 
decrease in gross business or evidence of estimated fu-
tnre profits. 
The rule m this state was set forth by the Utah 
Suprenw Court in Jenkins L'. Morgan, 123 Utah -±SO, 
~()() P.2d 532, as follows: 
"Before special damages for loss of profits 
to a general business occasioned by the wrongful 
acts of another may be recovered, it must be 
made to appear that the business had been in 
snecessfnl operation for such a period of time 
as to give it permanency and recognition, and that 
such uiJJsiness was earning a profit which could uc 
reasonably ascertained and appro;;rimated." (Em-
lJhasis Supplied.) 123 Utah 487. 
Sine<~ the income tax retnrn8 which were produced 
1J\ l)pfondant:::; and thP evidence herein indicates that 
D1"i'P1Hlant, We8tern State:::; Whole8ale Supply, had no 
14 
history of profit, Plaintiff ~mbrniti:; that it ii:; improlJt·r 
to admit any evidence regarding anticipated profits for 
the year 1966 under the theor~' that i:;uch evidence doe' 
not meet the legal standard of certainty and is i:;pecula 
tive. 
With regard to punitive damagei:;, it is necessary 
to plead and prove that a writ and levy of attaclnnrnt 
have been issued without carnse or \vithout probablP 
cause in order to obtain punitive damages for wrongful 
attachment. See Cahoon v. Ho,qglm, 31 Ut. 74, 8G Pae. 
963; 6 Am. Jur. 2d Attachment, Sec. 597. 
The giving of a bond which dis::;olves the attachment 
and has the effect of preventing a determination of it1 
regularity, precludes an action for wrongful attachment. 
See Rachelman v. Skinner, 46 Minn. 196, 48 NvV 776. 
Where probable cause is an element of an action for 
wrongful attachment, the ::;howing of probable cam;e i~ 
a defense and if Plaintiff had probable cause to issue 
the writ in this case, Defendants must fail in their clai111 
for wrongful attachment. See G Am. Jur. 2d Attachment. 
Sec. 617; Cahoon'&. Hoggan, Supra. 
Defendants below admitted liability for unpaid ren· 
tal at the time of the commencement of this action. SPe 
38-3-3, Utah Code Annotated 1953, provides in part: 
''Whenever any rent shall bP due and nnpaid 
under a lease ... theLessor may have tlw personal 
property of the Les::;ep which i::-; upon the h-'a~l·il 
premise::;, and ::mbject to ::;uch lit•n, attached w1tl1 
out other ground for ::;uch attachment.'' 
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Plaintiff submits that prouahl<' eause for the attach-
nwnt Jwrein exists. 
POINT III 
DEFENDANTS ARE ESTOPPED TO AS SE RT 
WRONGFUL ATTACHMENT. 
Where a Defendant gives a bond, eonditional to per-
l'orm the J ndgment which operates to discharge the 
attachment and makes the bond obligors unconditionally 
liable, such action renders immaterial the validity or even 
tlH' grounds upon which the attachment was based. Bee 
7 C.J.S., Sec. 313, Attachment. 
The validity of such an attachment is thereafter 
immaterial. First National Bank 11. McKean, (CCA Ore.) 
:285 Fed. 557. 
l111e attached party is thereafter estopped to deny 
Uw truth or sufficiency of the grounds upon which the 
\\'rit of attachment was issued or the regularity of the 
prneeedings. 7 CJS Attachment, Sec. 313 (see note 81 
therein and 13 Jurisdictions cited in support thereof) ; 
sPe also Mid-Continent Engineering Company u. Arrow 
f'etrolcwn Corporation, 45 Fed. Supp. 1000. 
'L1he election to dissolve a writ of attachment estops 
a DPfondant to claim that it was wrongful. Fidelity and 
f!1'l)(Jsil Co111pa11y of Maryla11rl 11• Cou/J, :213 Krntnek:·, 
t()/, :281 SvV 478. 
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POINT IV 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN AWARDING NO M-
IN AL DAMAGES AGAINST PLAINTIFF AND IN 
FAILING TO AWARD PLAINTIFF ATTORNEYS 
FEES. 
Because the lower Court found that Plaintiff had 
wrongfully attached the property of Defendants, it both 
awarded nominal damages against the Plaintiff and re-
fused to allow Plaintiff its attorneys foes provided under 
the lease. 
It is submitted that should this Court find that 
Plaintiff and Respondent did not wrongfully attach prop-
erty of the Defendants that the nominal damages should 
be disallo\ved and the case n·manded with instrnctiont-1 to 
modify the judgment so as to award a reasonable attor-
neys fee to the Plaintiff. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully submits that this Court shonld 
sustain the judgment of the lower court and find, in 
addition, that it did not wrongfully attach the premise1 
leased to Defendants herein nor wrongfully evict theJll 
from such premises, either constructively or otherwisr. 
Even if the elements of wrongful attachment are pre~­
ent, Defendants are estopped as a matter of law fro1n 
asserting such wrongful attachment. This Court shonld 
hold accordingly. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BETTILYON & HOWARD 
F. Burton Howard 
333 South Seeond East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Respondent 
